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One of a number of Bernoulli processes is selected at each of a number of stages. A success 
at stage i is worth cui and the problem is to maximize the expected payoff before the first failure. 
Results of Berry and Viscusi (1981) are generalized. Tn particular, we show that there is always 
an optimal strategy that uses a single process exclusively and indefinitely whenever the arms are 
independent and the discount sequence (at, cy2,. . .) is superregdar. There is not always a similar 
reduction in the number of strategies when the discount sequence is not superregular. 
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1. Introduction 
One of a number of Bernoulli processes 
each of a (possibly infinite) number of stages 
(or ‘arms’) is selected (or ‘pulled’1 at 
A success at stage i is worth cyi (ai ~0i . 
and the problem is to maximize the expected payoff before the first failure. The 
discount sequence (al, a2,. . . ) is not necessarily monotone, as is usually assumed. 
nor is C ai necessarily finite. Berry and Viscusi [2] consider a number OIF discount 
sequences for which an optimal strategy is to use one arm exclusively and indefinitely 
(that is, one which ‘stays on a winner’). But they point out (their Example 4.21 that 
no such strategy is optimal for general discount sequences. 
The present paper extends the Berry and Viscusi results [2]. We show (Theorem 
3.1) that there is an optimal strategy that uses a single arm whenever tht: arms are 
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independent and the discount sequence is superregular (Definition 2.5). Superregu- 
larity is a more restrictive condition than that of reguZari:y discussed by Berry and 
Fristedt [l]. The latter paper shows (in case the discount sequence is nonincreasing) 
that the stay-on-a-winner rule is optimal in the classical two-armed bandit with 
one arm known if and only if the discount sequence is regular. But in the present 
problem regularity is not enough, as is seen in Theorem 4.1. Even in the case of 
independence there are no neat characterizations of discount sequences for which 
the stay-on-a-winner ule is optimal: Example 4.2 shows that superregularity is not 
necessary, but Theorem 4.1 shows that it is almost necessary in a sense to be made 
clear later. 
Applications of this problem are discussed by Berry and Viscusi [I23, Viscusi [5,6] 
and c’iscusi and Zeckhauser [7]. 
2. Preliminaries 
Pulling arm j (j = 1, . . . , k ) generates a Bernoulli random variable for which the 
pro’jability of ‘success’ is pi. Given pr, . . . , pk such random variables are assumed 
i*3 t,\z mutually independent. The parameters pl, . . . , pk are themselves random 
Jariir bles with distribution measures F1, . . . , Fk, and in Sections 3 and 4 are assumed 
to b: independent. 
At each stage we are to pull one of the k arms. Let IV,,, be 1 if a success is 
ok.ineti 1:t stagi IN and 0 otherwise. For HZ = 1, 2, . . . define 
The probabilistic characteristics of the sequences {IV,,,} and {&} depend on the 
strategy used. For a given discount sequence .4 = icul, ~2,. l .) we want to find a 
strategy that maximizes the expected payoff, 
A strategy is called aptinznl if its expected payoff is 
1,’ = sup E i CY,,~~,,,, 
1 
whcrc the supremum is over all possible strategies. An arm that is the first selection 
of an optimal strategy is also called optimal. 
Because of the rather special nature of the problem, all sequential strategies of 
interest are very simple: since the only circumstance of interest occurs when all 
successes have been obtained, every strategy of interest is simply an infinite sequence 
of integers- the rlsth integer indicating the arm to be selected at stage m. 
We now show that there is an optimal strategy. 
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Lemma 2.1, Let 
Vn = sup E i cy,,Zn, 
1 
where the supremum is over all possible strategies. Then I’, + Vm as n + 00. 
Proof. Clearly, for any strategy, 
lim E i a,,&, c lim sup E i cy,$Z,,, , 
I1 *cm 1 n400 1 I 
(2.1) 
where the supremum is over all -possible strategies. The result follows by taking 
the supremum on the lTft-hand side of (2.1). El 
Proposition 2.2. There exists an optimal strategy. 
Proof. First suppose V = 00. Clearly, 
EZ,n= fi EP; 
i=l 
where tj is the number of times arm j is pulled during the first 172 stages. By the 
Holder inequality and induction on k we have 
k 
EZ,,, smax Epj” 
i 
< C Epy. 
i=l 
(2.2\ 
Therefore, 
9 
00 = V = sup i cy,, E Z,,, G ;;: F a,,1 EpS” 
I?1 = 1 j-1 m=l 
and so, for some j, 
the expected payoff using arm j exclusively, equals +a. So, in fact, there is a 
single-arm strategy which is optimal. 
Now suppose V < 00. Since there are only finitely many strategies up to stage ?I, 
there exists an optimal strategy 7,, for (CU 1, . . . , CY~, 0, 0, 0, . . .). We specify a strategy 
T recursively. The first pull agrees with 7,, for infinitely many n. Make the first 
m + 1 pulls of T agree with the first m + 1 pulls of rn for infinitely many tr. 
Let F :x 0. Since V < a, 
C CY,,, E pr < 00 for each j. 
1?1 = 1 
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Hence, M can be chosen to make 
In view of (2.2) and (2.3), if 7 agrees with T,, through stage M, then r is E-optimal 
for (aI, . . ..a.,,O,O,O,. .). Since T does so agree with r,, for infinitely many n and, 
by Lemma 2.1, V,, + V, T is E-optimal for A. The conclusion follows since r is 
f-optimal for every E >O. C 
For particular distributions, an optimal strategy is easy to specify. The following 
example is an immediate consequence of the first inequality in (2.2). It generalizes 
Theorem 3.1 of Berry and Viscusi [2]. 
Theorem 2.3. Suppose E py* 2 E py’ for i = 2, . . . , k dkvm.vr CY,,~ f 0. Then it is 
optimal to pull arm 1 forewr. 
Corollary 2.4. If F1 = l . . = Fk, then all single-arm strategies are optimal. 
The following concept is related to the notions of total positivity [4, Chapter 181 
and log-convexity. 
Definition 2.5. A discount sequence (aI, cyz, . . J is suparregitlar if, for all positive 
integers IN and tz, 
which is understood to be satisfied whenevel either side is O/O. 
Remarks. All superregular discount sequences are unimodal. It follows that a 
discount sequence A = (CQ, CQ, . . J is superregular iff both &.,+I ~LY,,,cY,,+~ for al! 
171 and all the members between any two positive members of A are positive. The 
geometric sequence (1, (Y, .a ‘, . I .) is superregular for any Q 2 0. Some other supcr- 
regular sequences are (C),0, 1, 1,. . . , 1, a, Ly2,. . .I for OGX.Gl and 
(0,1,2,3,4,0,0,. . .I. Nonincreasing superregular sequences are ‘reguEar’ as 
defined by Berry and Fristedt [l], but regular sequences are not necessarily super- 
regular; for instance, (1, 1, I, i, 0, 0, 0, . . .) is regular but not superregular. 
In the next section we characterize optimal strategies when the discount sequence 
is superregular and the arms are independent. 
3. Optimal strategies for superregular sequences 
The theorem in this section generalizes results of Berry and Visc:lsi [2], who 
considered k = 2 and particular discount sequences. Examples 4.1 and 4.2 of Berry 
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and Viscusi [2], in which the discount sequences (1, CY, cy ‘, . . .) and (10, cy, Q*, . . .) 
for CY E (0,l) are considered, can be instructive for u,nderstanding the following 
theorem. 
Theorem 3.1. Suppse A = (a~, CY~, . . .) is superregular. Then, for any k independent 
arms, there is an optimal strategy that uses a single arm forever. 
Remark. To see that the assumption of independence is necessary, suppose A = 
(1 * ,%a ¶ l l l ), a E (0, 1 ), k = 2 and (pi, ~23 is known to be either (a, 1) or (i, 0). If 
the probability of (.& 1) is less than (l- a)/(2 - czr ), then an optimal strategy must 
begin with a pull of arm 1 and must use arm 2 when the probability of ($, 1) becomes 
greater than (1 - a)/(2 - cw ). 
For the proof of Theorem 3.1 we shall use the following result. 
Lemma 3.2. For any c E [0, 1] and any random variable X with distribution measure 
F, there exists ari M = M(F, c ) E [I, a] sucb Aat, for positive integers m, 
EX”_‘(X-c) I CO ifm<M, 20 ifm&V. 
Proof. For u > 1 define 
g,(U)=EX”-l(X-c), 
which is an analytic function for any c E [O, 11. Then 
g:.(u)=EX”-‘(X-c)logX 
If g,(u)sO, then g:(u)30 since loge GO and 
n-“-‘(x-c)(logx-logc)z,O forallx~[O,l],cE[O,l]. 
The result follows from the ccntinuity of g, on (1, m) and the fact that )gJ I+) 2 
gJl)* 0 
Proof of Theorem 3.1. Let Cr, denote the set of all superregular discount sequences 
(a a*, l l .) satisfying the conditions cyll > 0 and cyIl cl = cy,,+* = l 9 l = 0. We proceed 
by induction on YE. 
If A E 91, the result is trivial. For n 2 2 assume that the result holds for every 
member of ..Yn_l. We will show that it holds for every member of !Y’“. 
If A=(cY~,(Y~,.. ) E Sp,, thzn (cy2, cy3, . . .) E Yn _l. By Proposition 2.2 and the 
inductive hypothesis, there is an optimal strategy T that uses a single arm at stages 
2 through n. So 7 uses at most two arms. If it uses only one arm the conciusion 
follows. Suppose it uses two arms, sc\y arm 1 initially ahd arm 2 thereafter. 
322 D.A. Berry, B. Fristedt / Success run for many-armed bandits 
Since T is optimal it is at least as good as 71: “Pull arm 1 at stages 1 and 2 and 
arm 2 thereafter”. Thus, the difference ii1 expected payoffs of r and 71 is nonnega- 
tive; that is, 
So using E y: a(E~i)~, we have 
(3.1) 
Let A4 = M(F2, Epr) as defined in Lemma 3.2. From (3.1) we have n WW+ 1; 
hence, since cy,, > 0, we may define ,- 
N = min{m : m 2 M, at,,+: > 0). 
In view of (3.1) we have 
x 
1 a~,,+1 E~“?Pz-Epl)=+ (3.2) 
rn = 1 
By superregularity, 
Therefore, (3.2) implies, using Lemma 3.2, 
That is, the expected payoff using 7 is no larger than that of pulling arm 2 exclusively ,
a strategy that is therefore optimal. 
It remains to consider the case in which cy,,, >O for infinitely many m. The proof 
of Proposition 2.2 applies easily where the T,, given there are chosen to be single-arm 
strategies. fL3 
4. Non-superregular discount sequences 
As in the previous section we assume that the arms are independent. When A 
is not superregular, then without knowing (Fr, . . . , Fk) it may or may not be 
possible to say that there is a single-arm strategy that is optimal. If the condition 
of superregularity fails in the first three stages, then Theorem 4.1 says that there 
:tre distributions Fj for which there is no such optimal strategy. However, if it does 
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not fail in the first three stages but does later, then, as Example 4.2 shows, there 
may always be an optimal single-arm strategy. 
Theorem 4.1. For any k independent arms, if A is such that ~11~~3 > cy 22, then there 
are distributions Fl, . . . , Fk for which all optimal strategies use at least two arms. 
Proof. Without loss we can assume k = 2. We shall show that the class of distribu- 
tions indexed by x and r as follows, 
F2({0)) =1 -r, 
contains a member which satisfies the theorem. 
Consider three strategies, (TV: “Pull arm 1 exclusively”, u2: “Pull arm 2 exclus- 
ively”, and u: “Pull arm 1 initially and arm 2 thl=reafter”. Let Di, i = 1,2, equal 
the expected payoff using G minus the expected payoff using ui. For S > 0, x 10 and 
r=!j - W/(2(Q+sjj, 
and 
2-sLy2 2 
D2=cu1(1-2r)x-2a~rx’+O(x3)=~-~2 
EX2+S 
x +0(x3). 
Since both D1 and D2 are positive for an appropriate fixed S and x sufficiently 
small, neither ~1 nor g2 is optimal. Cl 
In Theorem 4.1 superregularity was assumed to fail in the first three stages. If‘, 
instead, it fails in stages 2, 3 and 4, one might hope to prove a similar result by 
arranging for the right kind of distribution on (~1,. . . , pk) at stage 2. However, 
that turns out to be impossible; indeed, as the following example shows, all optimal 
strategies may be one-arm strategies in the absence of superregularity. 
Example 4.2. Consider the discount sequence (1, 1, E, E, 0, 0, 0, . . .) which is not 
superregular unless E = 0 or 1 (and not regular [l] for 0 < E < 0.5). We shall show, 
for 0 < E: s 0.5, that there is always a one-arm strategy that is optimal. 
Since we are still assuming independence we conclude from Theorem 3.1 that 
there is an optimal strategy that indicates the same arm after stage 3 as at stage 
3. Accordingly, we need consider no more than three arms-say arms 1,2, and 3. 
We use hij where each of h, i, j equals 1,2 or 3 to denote the strategy: “Pull arm !2 
at stage 1, arm i at stage 2, and arm J’ thereafter”, and V(hij) to denote the 
expected payoff for the strategy hij. We want to prove that V takes on its maximum 
at one of the strategies 111, 222, 333. 
324 D.A. Berry, B. Fristedt / Success run for many-armed bandits 
In case h, i, j are all distinct either V(h.ij) s V(hhj) or V(hij) G V(iij) by applica- 
tion of Theorem 3.1 for the discount sequences (1,l +E E pj +e E pf, 0, 0, 0, . . .). 
Thus, we may, and do, restrict our attention to strategies involving at most two 
arms - say, arm 1 and arm 2, and we assume E ~12 E ~2. 
There are six multi-arm strategies; we claim these are no better than one-arm 
strategies, a claim which will follow from: 
(i) V(l21)s V(lll), 
(ii) V(211) s V(l2l), 
(iii) V(112)G V(ll1) v V(222), 
(iv) V(221) s V( 111) v V(222), 
(v) V(122)s V(ll2) v V(222), 
(vi) V(212) c V(l22). 
We will demonstrate (iii), (iv) and (v) and leave the easier (i), (ii) and (vi) for the 
reader. 
Let p,,, and v,~ denote the mth moments of F1 and F2. 
The following calculation proves (iii) in the case v1 + ~2 s &l +p2: 
*:hc inequalities /~2~1 SJL~ and ~1 7 cp4 following from the Cauchy-Schwarz 
iinequality. If v1 + 1’2 > p 1 + ~2, then ‘,*;! > p2 (since 1~ s gl) and 
V(112)< z/1+ vz + EV-JV1-6 Vz) “G V] + v2 + & (v3 -t- Vj) = V(222). 
The following calculation proves (iv; in case v2 G CL?: 
5/..Q++Ju++(~L++J)= V(111). 
In cast’ LJ? )j~, using the Cauchy-Schwarz inequality, 
We now show (v). First assume p 1 2 l-+pl; we will show that V(122)~ V(112). 
To do this we calculate 
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which is an increasing function of I_c~, and therefore we need only consider p 1= 
vz/vl. In this case (4.1) becomes 
v2 -v:+E(v;-vylvp --v2- v:+E(v:v2-V~V~) 
3v2- v: +&(vp2 -V~)=(v2-&V~)-v~(vI-&V2), 
which, being the covariance of pz and an increasing function, p2 - :*pz, of ~2, is 
nonnegative [3]. It remains to consider the case ccl< V&Q, which by the Cauchy- 
Schwarz inequality implies 
ps= v3Ivz~v4lv3 W9 
We calculate 
V(222)- V(122) = v1- ~~+v~-~~Vy+E(V3-~~~.‘2+Vs-~lv3). (4.3) 
In view of (4.1), (4.2) and (4.3) we have 
1,,, !12)-- V(122)]+[V7222)- V(l22)]2 
Put 
a\1 - &)(v2-EI-1Vl)+8(V4-~lVJ), 
which by (4.2) is positive. Therefore, either V(ll2) 2 V( 122) or V(222) 2 V(l22). 
References 
El3 
PI 
[31 
141 
PI 
v4 
17‘1 
D.A. Berry and B. Fristedt, Bernoulli one-armed bandits-Arbitrary discount sequences, Ann. 
Statist. 7 (1979) 1086-1105. 
D.A. Berry and W.K. Viscusi, Bernoulli two-armed bandits with geometric termination, Stochastic 
Process. Appl. 11 (1981) 35-45. 
E.L. Lehmann, Some concepts of dependence, Ann. Math. Staiist. 37 (1966) 1137-l 153. 
A.W. Marshall and I. Olkin, Inequalities: Theory of Majorization and Its Applications (Academic 
Press, New York, 1979). 
W.K. Viscusi, Job hazards and worker quit rates: An analysis of adaptive worker behavior, Internat. 
Econ. Rev. 20 (1979) 29-58. 
W.K. Viscusi, Employment Hazards: An Investigation of Market Performance (Harvard University 
Press, Cambridge, 1979). 
W.K.. Viscusi and R. Zeckhauser, Environmental policy change under uncertainty, J. Environmental 
Econom. Management 3 ( 1976) 97-l 12. 
